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THE NEW DEAL

'CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION'
AS AN HISTORICAL PROBLEM
By EDWARD A. PURCELL JR.

structures of American politics, often characterized as the

The past
century
hasWhite'switnessed
a major shift in the
passingquarter
of "the New Deal
order." G. Edward
superb
new book The Constitution and the New Deal is a monument to that
sea change, a clear-eyed effort to assess the significance of the New
Deal and its iconic "constitutional revolution" from a self-consciously
removed perspective that regards the New Deal as truly "past" and its

well-established historiography as largely apologetic. Most prior
accounts of the New Deal and its "constitutional revolution," White
tells us, are "triumphalist narratives" that have had a "powerful and
distorting historiographical effect."

White's clearly written and cogently reasoned book is a pleasure to
read, but its ambition and complexity make it a challenge to review.

Although on one level it has a quite narrow focus, the book
nevertheless involves many issues and carries a variety of implica
tions, not all of which White spells out or explores in detail.

Its narrowness comes from the way it conceives its ostensible
subject. The Constitution and the New Deal does not inquire into the
complex, shifting, and interactive relationship that existed between

its two titled elements. Rather, it focuses instead on a single
well-known question: did the election of 1936 and, especially, the
"Court-packing" plan that President Franklin Roosevelt announced

the following February "cause" the Supreme Court to change its
interpretations of the Constitution in the spring of 1937?
The book's breadth and ambition, in contrast, come from the fact
that its true subject is not the Constitution and the New Deal as such
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but rather the evolution of American jurisprudence, the nature of
constitutional law, and the power of preconceptions to distort legal
and historical analysis. In exploring these themes the book operates

on at least six intertwined levels. It is a history of numerous
constitutional changes that occurred during the first half of the 20th

century; a study of the relationship between those changes and the
New Deal "constitutional revolution"; an intellectual history of "the

conventional account" of that relationship as it evolved over the
remainder of the 20th century; a broad reinterpretation of that
relationship which "minimizes the significance of the New Deal"
while stressing the central importance of "modernity"; a largely
implicit critique of recent work in "normative" constitutional history
for abusing the past to serve contemporary political purposes; and a

general argument about the causal role of the law's "internal"
categories and doctrines as opposed to the "external" pressures that

society places on law.
II

The "conventonal account," White explains, contends that the New
Deal inaugurated a "new era of constitutional law and constitutional

interpretation." This "new era" involved a substantial expansion of
governmental power, especially at the national level, and a new kind
of "bifurcated" judicial review that called for "deferential" scrutiny of

government economic regulations and "aggressive" scrutiny of gov
ernment actions impinging upon civil rights and liberties. In addition,

it embraced a new "modernist" jurisprudence that conceived of
Supreme Court justices "not as apolitical savants discerning the
essentialist principles of the Constitution but as political actors with

their own ideological agendas."

Challenging that "conventional account," the book pivots on its
reexamination of a narrowly defined "causal" issue. "At the core of
the conventional narrative," it declares, "is a group of events, taking
place within a relatively short time span, which have been invested

with causal prominence and whose ramifications have been assumed
to extend backward and forward over a considerable range of time."

As the account runs, between 1934 and 1936 the Supreme Court's
opposition to the New Deal's program of national economic régula
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tion created a titanic confrontation, but the election of 1936 and
Roosevelt's Court-packing plan ultimately pressured the justices to
abandon their prior views and remold the Constitution to accommo
date the New Deal.

White adopts two strategies to disprove that causal connection.
First, in four successive chapters he examines early 20th-century
developments in the law of foreign relations, administrative agencies,

and free speech. Those constitutional areas "lie somewhere on the

periphery of the conventional narrative's focus," White acknowl

edges, but he begins with them because the "most ambitious
versions" of the "conventional account" have "tended to posit a
constitutional revolution that swept through all areas of constitutional

law in the wake of the New Deal and the Court-packing crisis." The
chapters on the law of foreign relations and administrative agencies,
in particular, provide fresh and insightful analyses of major jurispru
dential areas that have too often been ignored or treated with little

historical sophistication. Together, the chapters demonstrate con
vincingly that major changes were well underway in all three areas
before the arrival of the New Deal and certainly before the election
of 1936. Further, they show that most of the doctrinal changes in the
three areas were not finalized during the years from 1937 to 1943 but

rather continued to take shape through the late 1940's and beyond.
Hence, the New Deal neither "caused" most of the basic doctrinal
changes nor cast the law into any final "New Deal" form.

White's second strategy of critique is confession and avoidance,
and he uses it to address those issues "at the very center of the

conventional account." He readily admits that the Court made
"revolutionary" changes in constitutional "political economy" doc
trines. "[0]nly an eccentric student of Contract, Commerce, and Due

Process Clause decisions between 1933 and 1943," he writes, "would
deny that the Court significantly altered its doctrinal posture in those

areas." What White seeks to avoid is the claim that those changes
were "caused" by political pressures created by the New Deal.

White summarizes the evidence against the election and Court
packing thesis in the political economy cases and quickly terms it
"discredited." Drawing on the illuminating work of Barry Cushman,
Richard Friedman, and others, he points, for example, to the fact that
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two of the Court's most innovative decisions—Nebbia v. New York

and Home Building 6- Loan Association v. Blaisdell—came down in
1934, that the Court reached its critical 1937 decision in West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish before Roosevelt announced the Court-packing plan,
and that the Court did not make its most sweeping changes until the

early 1940's, long after Court-packing had been abandoned and at a

time when "the composition of the Court bore almost no resem
blance to its composition in the 1936 Term."
White then offers an alternate explanation for the Court's admitted

doctrinal changes. Drawing heavily on Cushman's work, he maintains
that the Court's decisions in 1937 and afterward were the result of a
"gradual disintegration, in place since the 1920s, of the integrity of
the orthodox judicial doctrines and formulas." Indeed, for Cushman
and White, it was the Court's 1934 decision in Nebbia that was truly
"pivotal." Nebbia marked the "unravelling" of established due process

doctrine and logically paved the way for the drastic changes that
followed in the "political economy" cases.
Structurally, White's "doctrinal disintegration" thesis concerning

the "political economy" cases parallels his initial argument based on

the three "peripheral" constitutional areas of foreign relations,
administrative law, and free speech. Both lines of argument coincide

to show that pathbreaking changes which subsequently became
associated with the New Deal were, in fact, well underway long

before 1932.

To understand the significance of White's book, it is important to

recognize the way that it minimizes two other theses about the
relationship between the New Deal and the "constitutional revolu
tion." One stresses the profound crisis created by the Great Depres
sion and the popular and unprecedented efforts of the New Deal to

respond. This thesis suggests that those compelling circumstances
may well have influenced one or more of the justices who inaugu

rated the "constitutional revolution" in 1937—most likely Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes and especially Justice Owen J. Rob
erts—and nudged them toward doctrinal interpretations that would

approve the new governmental activism. While White would likely
acknowledge those conditions as contributing factors, he would insist
on their subsidiary significance. If the doctrinal basis of the "consti
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tutional revolution" lay in the "disintegration" of established doctrine
that had been "in place since the 1920s," the causal significance of the

Great Depression as well as the New Deal must wither.
A second thesis, also implicitly minimized, stresses the fact that

Roosevelt reconstituted the Court with seven new appointments
between the summer of 1937 and 1943. White readily acknowledges
the doctrinal impact of the Roosevelt appointees, but he marginalizes

their significance with respect to the "causal" question on two
grounds. First, he restricts the question to a narrow time frame: did

the New Deal pressure the "old" Court—that is, the Court prior to
the ascension of any of Roosevelt's appointees—to repudiate any of
its own doctrines? Given that definition of the question, the role of
Roosevelt's appointees and of the Court's decisions after the summer
of 1937 is simply irrelevant. Second, White portrays the subsequent

decisions of the Roosevelt appointees as essentially extensions or
corollaries that followed from the "disintegration" of established

doctrine. Because those pre-existing doctrinal developments pre
pared the way for the "constitutional revolution," the Roosevelt
appointees, with "less of an investment" in orthodox jurisprudence,
were "relatively free to fashion a new set of doctrinal approaches."

White's overall "causal" thesis, then, consists of two principal
propositions with room for two subsidiary refinements. The principal

propositions are that the "constitutional revolution" was not caused

by the election of 1936 or the Court-packing plan and that it was

caused, at least primarily, by an interrelated series of doctrinal
developments that were well underway before the coming of either

the Great Depression or the New Deal. The first refinement is that

broader social pressures might have influenced one or more of the
justices but that, if they did, the influence was quite limited: limited
because any such influence was the result of general circumstances,
not politics (that is, any such influence arose from the general need
to deal with the Depression and had its effect by the time of Nebbia

in 1934, before any overt political threats had been made); and
limited because any such influence could have affected the Court
only because the prior doctrinal "disintegration" had opened logical
pathways through which the Court could reach "lawful" new accom
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modations. The second refinement is simpler. The Roosevelt appoin
tees extended, but did not "cause," the "constitutional revolution."
Thus the fundamental importance of White's book—and the point
of its tighdy constrained definition of the "causal" issue—is that it

offers a sophisticated historical explanation of the "constitutional
revolution" while affirming the institutional integrity of the Supreme

Court and the reality of the rule of law. On the one hand, the book
accepts four historical propositions that challenge normative theories
of constitutional law: that doctrine evolves continuously, if unevenly;

that judges adapt legal doctrines to changing social circumstances;
that judicial decisions reflect the personal values of the judges; and
that changes in judicial personnel often change the law. On the other
hand, the book also affirms two cornerstone propositions that support

the ideal of constitutional government and the rule of law. One of
those propositions is jurisprudential: that, regardless of the values of

individual judges and the reality of doctrinal change over time,
established legal principles, categories, and doctrines do, in fact, limit
and channel judicial behavior. The other proposition is institutional:
that in the 1930's, even though subject to intense pressures, neither

the Supreme Court nor any of its justices—officials "whose very
identity is bound up in canons of impartiality and fidelity to the

authority of law in America"—succumbed to any type of overt
political threat or betrayed their own established constitutional
principles.

The Constitution and the New Deal is thus sophisticated history
that seeks to affirm profoundly important jurisprudential and insti
tutional messages. It was, of course, written before the appearance of
Bush v. Gore.
Ill

White's resolution of the "causal" issue sets the stage for two
follow-up questions. One is why—if the Court's decisions in 1937
were merely extensions of prior doctrine—contemporaries nonethe
less perceived a "constitutional revolution." The other is why—in the

face of overwhelming contradictory evidence—the "conventional
account" became, and remained, so widely accepted. White's inter
related answers are clear and sweeping.
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His answer to the first question is that contemporaries reacted as

they did because there was, indeed, a "constitutional revolution."
What they experienced, however, was not a doctrinal revolution
"caused" by the New Deal but rather a much broader transformation

in constitutional and judicial theory. In the late 1930s and early
1940's, White argues, the Court rejected "three core elements of
orthodox late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century constitutional
jurisprudence." The first was "an essentialist conception of constitu

tional principles" that were considered rooted in the text of the
Constitution. The second was "a theory of constitutional adaptivity"

that understood judicial decisions—no matter how novel—as merely
reaffirmations of the "essentialist meaning of constitutional princi
ples." The third was what White calls "guardian review," the faith that

in construing the Constitution judges merely marked out "preor

dained boundaries between public power and private rights and
between the nation and the states."

In place of those orthodoxies the post-1937 Court substituted
"modernist theories of legal authority and judicial interpretation."
Modernism rejected "essentialist ideas" of pre-existing principles and

boundaries, embraced a theory of constitutional adaptivity that
assumed a "living Constitution" whose meaning changed over time,

and replaced "guardian review" with "bifurcated review," a more
overtly subjectivist practice of judging economic regulations defer
entially while protecting civil rights and liberties aggressively. "The
result was a constitutional revolution," White declares, "one in which
Supreme Court justices themselves had concluded that there was no
intelligible distinction between the authority of legal sources and that

of their designated interpreters." It "was, fundamentally, an inter
pretative revolution, a revolution stemming from an altered juristic
consciousness."

White's answer to the second follow-up question flows from his
answer to the first. In spite of contradictory evidence, the "conven

tional account" commanded allegiance because it symbolized the
triumph—and authenticated the validity—of the modernism that
brought about the true "constitutional revolution." The "triumph of
modernist theories of the nature of law" altered the behavior of the

Supreme Court itself and shaped the views of subsequent genera
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tions of commentators. The inheritors of this triumphant modernism

consequently embraced the "conventional account" because they
cherished both the New Deal and the Court-packing plan as "vivid
modernist symbols." The former symbolized "the formative period of
modernist governance in America" and affirmed the modernist faith
in the capacity of human beings to control their own destiny "through

creative uses of government." The latter illustrated the human,
pragmatic, and non-essentialist nature of judging. It served as "a
symbolic affirmation of the [modernist] proposition that judges, in
their role as constitutional interpreters, made law in the legislative
sense."
Thus, White's answer to the second follow-up question is straight

forward. The "conventional account" cast its spell because later
generations believed that the New Deal must have been able to
control events and that the justices must have responded to political

pressures. Their modernist assumptions demanded it.
IV

This truncated summary fails to do justice to the subtlety and
complexity of The Constitution and the New Deal. It does, however,

suggest the book's basic themes as well as its historical and intellec
tual breadth. White succeeds admirably in his goal of "complicating"
our ideas about the "constitutional revolution" and historicizing our
understanding of its "conventional account." The book's aggressively
revisionist nature will surely provoke scholars to reconsider a wide
range of issues in 20th-century constitutional history. To start the ball

rolling, three comments seem useful.
A.

One of the most striking characteristics of The Constitution and
the New Deal is its inattention to "politics" of any kind, whether on
the level of ideology and values, public policy proposals, elections and

voting blocs, social and economic conflicts, or partisan tactical
maneuvering. This absence is particularly surprising coming from a
historian as sophisticated as White, who over the years has shown an
acute awareness of the ways in which political, cultural, and personal
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factors interact with legal issues. This is especially surprising, too,

because White readily acknowledges that the true "constitutional
revolution"—the rise and triumph of modernist consciousness—was

not a matter of formal doctrinal change but a consequence of
complex social dynamics.

The absence of politics, however, means that the book leaves out

an element essential to any understanding of the "constitutional
revolution" as an historical phenomenon. Regardless of doctrinal
logic and conceptual categories, liberals and conservatives alike
heralded a "constitutional revolution" because the Court's decisions
in 1937 were widely perceived as the culmination of a long, intense,
and well-understood political struggle. For more than half a century

Populists, progressives, and New Dealers had criticized the Supreme
Court—and the entire federal judiciary—as the protector of wealth
and property. The doctrines that White mentions, and many others

that he does not, spurred repeated protests and shaped a vibrant
political tradition that attacked the Court on a wide variety of
grounds ranging from intellectual rigidity to raw social partisanship.

Political conservatives and corporate lawyers contributed to the
tradition by vigorously defending the Court's absolute institutional

purity and insisting that its decisions were based on unchanging
principles of justice and law.

That pervasive political conflict appeared among the justices
themselves, not only in their judicial dissents but in their private
thoughts as well. In 1936, for example, the three "progressives" took
deep satisfaction from the widespread public criticism that erupted
after the Court's 5 to 4 decision invalidating a minimum wage law in

Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo. Justice Harlan F. Stone
gloated to Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo that "there are some doses
too nauseous for even a hidebound conservative to swallow." Cardozo
replied in kind. "I think we should be more than human if we failed
to sit back in our chairs with a broad grin upon our faces." To Justice

Louis D. Brandeis, Stone declared that the attacks were particularly

satisfying given "the source from which they come." Even the
staunchest conservatives were beginning to recognize "that after all

there may be something in the protest of the so-called liberal
minority." The criticism of Tipaldo was so vigorous, Stone informed
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Cardozo a few weeks later, that "our brethren" in the majority were

attempting to avoid responsibility by blaming their decision on a
technical flaw in the appeal papers. Their purported excuse, Stone
wrote scornfully, was "a flimsy evasion." During the mid 1930's, in
fact, the three "progressives" caucused regularly in preparation for

the Court's Saturday conferences. The Court's conservative justices,
the "Four Horsemen," did the same. Not surprisingly, there seems to
be no record of any member of either of the two groups being invited
to the other's caucus.

In the spring of 1937 both the standing political lines and the
significance of the cases on the Court's docket were clear. Under
standably, then, when the Court announced its decisions, it seemed

to most observers—New Dealers and their adversaries alike—that

the Court had "changed" and that the New Deal had "won." In
context, it is not at all puzzling why legal commentators would think
that something akin to a "constitutional revolution" had taken place,

nor why New Dealers would happily proclaim it as such. Indeed,
from the very beginning the label had more than a little of the
polemical and rhetorical about it.
Thus, the "constitutional revolution" cannot be reduced to, or fully

understood, as either a change in formally stated doctrines or as a

transformation in dominant legal "consciousness." Both of those
changes were important, but the New Deal "constitutional revolu
tion" was also a complex political transformation that included a
variety of critical elements. One was a major realignment in the
nation's political structure. A second was a substantial alteration in
the roles and interrelationships of the various branches of govern
ment. A third was a fundamental change in the Court's animating
social and political values. The Court that refused to review hostile
interpretations of the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act in the

lower courts between 1932 and 1937, for example, was a Court
inspired by different substantive values than the Court that enforced

that statute readily and vigorously in 1938.
Indeed, a change in the Court's substantive values was apparent in

West Coast Hotel—the decision that White fairly terms "the very
centerpiece" of the "conventional account." In a perceptive analysis
White shows that Hughes's majority opinion, in spite of overruling
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Adkins v. Children's Hospital, stayed within the formal boundaries of

traditional "guardian review." What he passes over, however, is the

fact that the Chief Justice's opinion also contained a truly radical
change of view. Freedom of contract in the labor market, Hughes

wrote, provided "what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable

employers." West Coast Hotel may have followed the form of
"guardian review," in other words, but it also reflected social and

political values that would fundamentally reshape the practical
significance of that form.

By ignoring political context the book also overinflates the causal

role of "modernist theory." While changing jurisprudential ideas
were an integral part of the "constitutional revolution," those ideas

did not determine events and perceptions in a vacuum. Indeed,
jurisprudential "modernism" arose in part from, and developed in
close connection with, the tradition of political protest that indicted
the Court for intellectual rigidity and political bias.

Furthermore, the generations that subsequently perpetuated the

New Deal's "triumphalist" narrative were surely responding to the

interpretative needs of their own later political commitments as

much or more than they were compelled by their modernist
assumptions. Imagine the situation where scholars discovered signif
icant evidence of a constitutional "original intent" that supported a
right to abortion or affirmative action. Would it require a cynic to

predict a massive passing of theoretical ships in the night between
right and left?
B.

In an illuminating discussion of Senator and then Justice George
Sutherland, White highlights a perplexing issue—the role of individ
ual values in judicial decisionmaking. As early as 1909, White tells us,

Sutherland as a senator set out "to revise the cast of orthodoxy" in

constitutional foreign relations law, and his ideas proved to be "a
singularly influential force in the transformation of' the field. Al
though strictly orthodox in domestic constitutional law, Sutherland

"supported aggressive, expansionist foreign policy initiatives" and

elaborated "a theory of national foreign relations powers" that
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bypassed constitutional limitations and rested on "inherent" powers
of national sovereignty. The "primary thrust" of his thinking "was to

disassociate" foreign relations powers "from the essentialist struc
ture" of domestic "enumerated and reserved [powers] constitutional
jurisprudence." Ultimately, as a justice in 1936, Sutherland wrote the
Court's opinion in United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Co. where,
with "breathtakingly broad scope and dubious use of authorities," he

wrote his earlier theories into law. Rejecting the principles of
orthodoxy, Sutherland's opinion conferred near absolute discretion

on the president and ruled that "the 'inherent' foreign relations
power of the federal government was extraconstitutional."
White uses Sutherland's work on foreign relations law effectively
for several purposes. First, it shows that one of the legendary "Four

Horsemen" was neither a stereotypical reactionary nor a rigid
"mechanical" jurist. Second, it bolsters White's "causal" argument by

demonstrating that "some transformative doctrinal changes" were

underway long before the New Deal. Third, it exemplifies how
"orthodox" constitutional thinking began to change under pressure
from "some dramatic and frightening features of modernity," in this

instance "the increasingly expansive and foreboding character of the
emerging twentieth-century international order." Finally, exemplify

ing the "awkward and painful accommodation of constitutional
orthodoxy to modernity" that later generations failed to recognize,

Sutherland's career illustrates the bias and inadequacies of their

"conventional account."

As intellectual history White's analysis is compelling, but it is
problematic as a critique of "modernist theory" or a defense of the

rule of law. After all, it shows that Sutherland rejected established
law and literally wrote his own personal views into the Constitution.

That surely supports a basic "modernist" idea and complicates any
theory of legal determinacy. Further, Sutherland's foreign relations

jurisprudence demonstrates that he was not an "essentialist" in any
absolute or "principled" way. Rather, he was an "essentialist" who was

prepared to abandon "essentialism" as well as limited government

when he saw a good reason to do so. Thus in his case, at least,
"orthodoxy" and "essentialism" seem to represent something far
more complex—and far more socially, politically, and individually

This content downloaded from 149.10.125.20 on Wed, 07 Nov 2018 14:54:46 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

250 THE VIRGINIA QUARTERLY REVIEW
rooted—than an established and controlling legal "epistemology."
Finally, Sutherland's behavior raises a basic question. Why did he
abandon "essentialism" in foreign relations law but remain rigidly
orthodox in domestic law? Clearly, a satisfactory explanation for the
difference cannot rest on either the absence of modernist pressures

on domestic constitutional law or Sutherland's simple fidelity to
orthodox doctrine and faith in the unalterable principles inherent in
the Constitution.

Indeed, Sutherland's abandonment of constitutional limitations
and his embrace of "inherent" sovereign powers brings to mind the

parallel behavior of another of the Court's legendary "anti
progressives," Justice David J. Brewer. Rejecting the idea of "inher

ent" power as a justification for executive and legislative action,
Brewer readily embraced the idea to justify the judicial power used

to crush the Pullman Strike of 1894. Like Sutherland, Brewer was

also an exponent of an unchanging Constitution, jurisprudential
essentialism, and judicially-enforced limitations on government. He

was also—again like Sutherland—a willing instrumentalist dans les
grandes occasions.
The careers of Sutherland and Brewer highlight the unavoidable,
if variously constrained, role that individual and personal factors play
in constitutional law. For his part, Brewer readily accepted that truth.

A judge, he insisted, must be prepared to "assert his convictions of

right and wrong." Dissenting in West Coast Hotel, Sutherland
acknowledged a similar understanding. "The check upon the judge,"
he declared, "is that imposed by his oath of office, by the Constitution

and by his own conscientious and informed convictions."
The important conclusion is not that Brewer and Sutherland were

bad people, or bad judges, or even unusual judges. Rather, it is that

they were not only judges but judges on a most unusual court—a
court shaped by a long and complex process of institutional evolu
tion—that has come to address issues that often allow and sometimes

compel both "instrumentalist" responses and recourse to personal
"convictions." Nor is the conclusion either that they were always and

simply "instrumentalists" or that they faced no constraints from
inherited legal doctrines and concepts. Rather, the point is that on
various issues and on various occasions they had varying amounts of
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discretion which they used in varying ways, depending in varying

degrees on their own varying values and perceptions at different
historical moments. Such a conclusion must surely be deeply unsat
isfying for stereotypical "traditionalists" and "behavioralists" alike.
That generality, nonetheless, is one of the lessons of the historian's
judicial history.

That truth suggests one of the limits—and it is a limit, not a
refutation—of White's "doctrinal disintegration" thesis. The mere

fact that doctrinal evolution had opened new pathways neither
required any of the justices to trod them nor specified when, to what
extent, and for what purposes they were to be followed. At any point

in time justices have a wide variety of premises, logics, shadings, and
distinctions—legal and factual—available to shift in varying degrees

the vectors of constitutional interpretation. Few cases reach the
United States Supreme Court without plausible arguments on at least

two, if not more, different sides. Thus, "doctrinal disintegration"
could be but one of the factors that "caused" the "constitutional
revolution."
Those thoughts suggest, finally, that White's focus on the evolution

of formal doctrine leads him to overlook what might be a critical
factor in the "constitutional revolution." Much of the entire contro
versy stemmed from the performance of one person, Justice Owen J.

Roberts, the ultimate "swing" justice. Scholars have generally seen

Roberts as wanting in self-confidence, lacking a well-considered
constitutional jurisprudence, and susceptible to the influence of
other justices and, perhaps, to outside pressures as well. Roberts
himself acknowledged his own disappointment with his judicial
performance. Had his seat been filled by another, the constitutional
history of the 1930's would likely have been quite different, perhaps
even without a "constitutional revolution" of any type.
While a "weak justice" thesis seems plausible, it also appears to be •

unacceptable to many. Foundational issues—the practice of consti
tutional government and the rule of law—are at stake, and it seems
unsatisfying to explain something as spectacular as a "constitutional
revolution" as the consequence of a single uncertain and vascillating

individual. We reject such an interpretation, perhaps, for the same

reason that many people reject the idea that a crazed individual,
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acting entirely alone, could assassinate a president of the United
States. It could, nonetheless, be true.
C.

White's book is also a broad-guaged assault on a certain kind of
constitutional history that has gained prominence in the past two
decades. In particular, White attacks the work of law professors Cass
Sunstein and Bruce Ackerman for attempting to meet the challenge
of Reagan "originalism" by manipulating historical materials to serve
the purposes of contemporary modernist liberalism. In addition, to
broaden his thesis, White also criticizes the work of historian Laura

Kaiman, who has been sympathetic toward Ackerman's work and,
according to White, produced "another reconstructed version of the

conventional account." Clinging to the view that judges are merely

political actors, her work "suggests that the most fundamental
challenge to the conventional account of American constitutional
histoiy may be one directed toward its modernist-inspired, behav
ioralist assumptions about constitutional law and judging."
With respect to Sunstein and Ackerman, White's comments seem

fair if incomplete. Ackerman's work is overtly "theoretical," while

Sunstein has acknowledged his search for "a useable past." Their
politics, purposes, and strategies are hardly secret. What White
leaves out in his effort to historicize their work, however, is a
discussion of the "originalist" campaign—equally partisan and prob
lematic—which prompted their efforts. If judges and scholars accept

lawyered history, then Sunstein and Ackerman can be blamed for
little more than playing the game. If they are to be historicized, the
work that provoked them should be treated similarly.

In fairness, White may intend—though implicitly and indirect
ly—to do just that. In an intriguing chapter he traces the growing use

of the term "substantive due process" from 1938 through the late

20th century, suggesting that the term served the conscious and
unconscious purposes of commentators and distorted the nature of

early 20th-century constitutional jurisprudence. Thus, his analysis
suggests some of the uncertainties and dangers inherent in efforts to

unearth any "original intent." One is that researchers who serve
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contemporary purposes and seek forensic leverage transform the
quest from the merely daunting to the intrinsically dubious. Another
is that the denotations and connotations in our luxuriant vocabularies
change, and the passing years pile layer upon layer of meaning onto

the words and concepts we use. Without careful attention to the
individual history of each, we cannot recapture the "lost attitude
toward constitutional interpretation" that marked a prior age.

Thus, White seems to suggest that when researchers seek a
directive "original intent" from a time further removed than the early

20th century, they are even more likely to produce mere confirma

tions of their contemporary views. There are, he insists, "striking

perceptual differences" between the current generation and those
who lived through the "constitutional revolution." By underscoring
substantial "perceptual differences" between generations which lived
a mere 65 years apart, he implies that contemporary commentators

who seek a more distant "original intent" have embarked on a
particularly hazardous and suspect enterprise. As he wisely warns
against liberal efforts to schematize the New Deal for contemporary
purposes, he seems to warn equally, if less overtly, against conserva

tive efforts to find "answers" to current problems in any more
distanced "original intent."

With respect to Kaiman, White's comments stand on a somewhat
different footing. Acknowledging her own political views, Kaiman has

struggled openly with complex historical materials. The fact that she

stresses "the deeply behavioral character of judging"—especially in
considering the events of the 1930's—hardly provides a basis for

inferring that she rejects all claims that legal materials may play
causal roles in shaping judicial decisions. Nor does it provide a basis

for concluding that she equates such claims with a "revival of an
older, unreflective caricature of judging as an apolitical process."

Ironically, White's discussion of Kalman's work highlights the
unresolved issue that lies at the heart of The Constitution and the
New Deal: the role of legal materials in shaping judicial decisions.
The book stresses that a dominant modernist "behavioralism" has
inculcated the belief that judicial decisions are nothing but ordinary

political actions and that modernism has consequently created a
"large hole" in the middle of "the conventional account." That hole,
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White insists, "can only be filled by close analysis of the world of early

twentieth-centuiy constitutional doctrines, categories, and analo
gies." A fair enough hypothesis. Rehavioralists apparently exist, and
the "constitutional revolution" seems for them an ideal nesting spot.

But the real historical question about the causal role of legal
doctrines and concepts is not a general one. Few knowledgeable
scholars would suggest that legal concepts and doctrines never have
causal significance, and fewer still would claim that they always have
such force. Insofar as the question can ever be answered clearly and

convincingly, it can only be answered for specific times, places,
issues, courts, and judges.

As a sophisticated lawyer and historian, White seems to acknowl

edge that conclusion. His goal, he tells us, is only to complicate
history by insisting that legal doctrines and concepts have some causal

significance. Indeed, he notes that "traditional" judicial decisionmak
ing in the early 20th century was "not fully consistent" with essen
tialism and that "guardian review" itself was "seemingly designed to

give judges a fair amount of latitude." Moreover, he readily admits

that "changes in constitutional law doctrines have been habitual in
the history of the Court." In fact, White offers that last proposition as

a reason for testing the "causal" impact of the Court-packing plan

solely by events in the first half of 1937. "If the time frame is
broadened," he explains, "adherents of the Court-packing thesis are

able to contrast a fairly large sample of pre-1937 decisions with
several post-1937 decisions, illustrating changes in constitutional
doctrine." But establishing substantial change in a broadened time
frame would not prove any special "revolution" because "that sort of
exercise can be undertaken, if a sufficient time interval is employed,
for any period in the Court's history."

Ultimately, then, the broader argument of The Constitution and

the New Deal is ironic. There was no New Deal "constitutional
revolution" because constitutional law was, and continues to be, a
constantly evolving phonemenon.
More striking, the book never actually shows that legal doctrines

and concepts did, in fact, "cause" any judicial decision. Indeed,
insofar as it identifies "doctrinal disintegration" as a causal factor in
the "constitutional revolution," its argument would seem to imply a
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dominant causal role for other, unspecified non-doctrinal factors.
After all, if doctrine was disintegrating, how could it have the power

to "cause" constitutional changes? Did disintegration not mean,
rather, that doctrine necessarily declined in significance and thereby

allowed wider play to substantive values and assumptions different
from those that were embedded in the crumbling orthodoxy?

Such questions are the inevitable fruit of a book as ambitious and
provocative as The Constitution and the New Deal. We are in White's

debt for challenging us to rethink some of the broadest and most
fundamental issues in American constitutional law and history.
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